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“The capacity for dissociation enables the young child to
exercise their innate life-sustaining need for attachment in
spite of the fact that principal attachment figures are also
principal abusers.”
-Warwick Middleton1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2014, a father discovered sexually explicit
messages and photographs exchanged between his fifteen-year-old
son and forty-one-year-old Krista Muccio.2 Despite Muccio’s
constitutional challenges to her charges, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that Muccio was lawfully charged with felony
communication with a child describing sexual conduct. In doing so,
the court held that Minnesota Statute section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2) does not substantially regulate protected speech and does not
facially violate the First Amendment.3 Minnesota Statute section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2) prohibits a person eighteen years or

1. Warwick Middleton, Warwick Middleton Quotes, GOOD READS, https://www.
goodreads.com/author/quotes/7085770.Warwick_Middleton (last visited Oct. 20,
2017). Warwick Middleton is an Australian psychiatrist and author, dealing
especially with the effects of trauma in society. Warwick Middleton, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/in/warwick-middleton-md-1614a012/ (last visited Dec.
1, 2017).
2. 890 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2017).
3. Id.
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older4 from using “the internet, a computer, or any other electronic
device capable of electronic data storage or transmission in
communication with a child or someone the person reasonably
believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct.”5 The
court held that the statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep”6 because
much of the speech it regulates is integral to criminal conduct and
therefore is not protected by the First Amendment.7 Even though
the statute prohibits some speech protected by the First
Amendment, the court upheld its validity because the statute is not
substantially overbroad in comparison to its legitimate sweep.8 The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Muccio correctly followed
the development of First Amendment jurisprudential doctrine.9 The
constitutional inquiries made by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Muccio are similar to those in many other First Amendment cases.10
However, the ever-constant creation of new forms of electronic
communication necessitates new applications of well-established
First Amendment principles. The Muccio decision is particularly ripe
for discussion given its relevance in our increasingly technologicallysavvy society.
This case note begins by providing some background on the
First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and the
underlying statutory framework.11 A discussion of constitutional
doctrine surrounding the First Amendment follows.12 Next, this note

4. Id. at 919 n.2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) (2016))
(“[T]hroughout this opinion, [the court] use[s] the term ‘adult’ to refer to ‘[a]
person 18 years of age or older.’”).
5. Id. at 919 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) (2016)).
6. See id. at 920.
7. Id. at 923 (citing State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn.
2016)).
8. Id. at 929; see State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998)
(explaining that a statute is overbroad on its face if “it prohibits constitutionally
protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending
constitutional rights” (citation omitted)). Before a court decides to address a facial
overbreadth challenge, the court must determine whether the statute in question
implicates the First Amendment. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419. Then, if the court
determines the First Amendment is not implicated, a court need go no further
because no constitutional question is raised. Id.
9. See infra section IV.
10. Id.
11. Infra Part II.A.
12. Infra Part II.B.
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explains the factual and procedural history of Muccio.13 The analysis
section of this note argues that the court reached the correct
decision in holding upholding the constitutionality of section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2).14 Furthermore, in the interest of good
public policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that the
state may criminalize sexual communications with one of the most
vulnerable groups in our society: children.15
II. HISTORY
A.

The First Amendment’s Guarantee for Freedom of Speech

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”16 Despite continued
attempts of judges and scholars alike to define the scope of First
Amendment protections, many fundamental conflicts remain
surrounding the limits of this constitutional right.17
The First Amendment is integral to modern American society.
It was described by renowned Supreme Court Justice Benjamin
Cardozo as “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom.”18 Without the First Amendment’s guarantee
of various individual liberties, American democracy would not
successfully exist in its current form.19 In its entirety, the First
13. Infra Part III.
14. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 923–25; infra Part IV.A.
15. See Brief for Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 15, State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017) (No.
A15-1951), 2016 WL 3924135 [hereinafter Brief for MNCASA] (arguing that the
Minnesota Legislature’s intent in section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is to protect
children from sexual predators); infra Part IV.B.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory on the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 55 (1989) (noting the attempts of
various judicial opinions and scholarly articles to define the First Amendment’s
protections to Freedom of Speech). Solum asserts that “Jürgen Habermas’ theory
of communicative action can serve as the basis for an interpretation of the First
Amendment.” Id. Solum further opines that Habermas’ theory “fits the general
contours of existing First Amendment doctrine and provides a coherent justification
for the freedom of speech.” Id.; see generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press vol. 2 1985)
(delineating the information from which Solum draws his thesis).
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
19. See id. (“Without freedom of speech, individuals could not criticize
government, practice religion, speak out against abuses, assemble together for
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Amendment protects two areas of individual liberties: the freedom
of religion and the freedom of expression.20 Among the First
Amendment’s guarantee of “freedom of expression” lies the
exclusive right of “freedom of speech.”21 The First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of speech is echoed in several states’
constitutions.22 Many of the states’ constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech existed prior to the ratification of the United
States Constitution.23 On June 8, 1789, James Madison introduced
an initial version of the Bill of Rights to Congress.24 Madison created
his list of proposed amendments from existing state constitutions.25
The freedoms Madison observed through his consideration of state
constitutions directly influenced the final text of the First
Amendment.26
Prior to World War I, courts treated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech much less expansively than courts do
today.”27 However, since courts have begun to favor a broader

common causes and petition the government for redress of grievances.”).
20. See id. The First Amendment contains five explicit freedoms: freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom
to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. XV (“That the freedom of the press is one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained.”); PA. CONST.
art. XII (“[T]he people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and
publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be
restrained.”).
23. See 1 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom of
Speech § 1:2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at § 1:1 (explaining how Madison examined some of the common
freedoms found in state constitutions during the process of drafting the First
Amendment).
27. See id. at § 1:4 (explaining that in the years during and immediately
following World War I, legislation was passed to silence political opponents of sitting
legislators and other dissidents); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). Compare Schenck, 249 U.S. at
47 (emphasizing the context of the defendant’s speech as a basis to uphold their
convictions under the 1918 Sedition Act), with Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715
(1931) (holding that public officers should find redress for false accusations in libel
laws, not in laws designed to limit the publication of periodicals or speech of persons
in general).
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application in various scenarios, interpreting the First Amendment’s
original text has presented new difficulties.
The Framers’ original intent when drafting the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution is often at the center
of these discussions.28 However, discerning the original intent of the
Framers presents further complex questions.29 Since the Framers
primarily sought to determine whether to codify the Bill of Rights
amendments, the bulk of textual interpretation has been left to the
courts.30 The protections the First Amendment offers can stand at
odds with the objectives of private persons, corporations, or even the
government itself.31
B. Limitations to the First Amendment’s Guarantee for Freedom of
Speech
1. Police Power and Distaste
The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech is not
without bounds.32 This freedom should not completely deprive the
government of its authority to exercise its police powers.33 Judicial
opinions from jurisdictions across the United States have identified
several areas in which the government may abridge the citizenry’s
freedom of speech in exercising its police powers.34 The government
may adopt reasonable regulations in order to promote overall public
health, morals, and safety.35 Therefore, when evaluating a statutory
28. See id.
29. See id. § 1:2 (highlighting the difficulty of determining the intent of the
“many persons involved in the process of drafting, approving, and ratifying the Bill
of Rights”).
30. Id.; see generally State v. Hall, 887 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
(offering a general discussion about interpretation of the First Amendment).
31. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:2 (2017)
(discussing how even the framers came into conflict with the ideals they had
memorialized when later seeking to institute censorship).
32. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 964 (2017).
33. Id. (listing circumstances under which the State may authorize “the
legitimate exercise of its police powers” to restrict speech).
34. Id. (including promoting general welfare, public health, public safety,
public morals, and to prevent fraud); see also
35. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1953) (discussing public
safety and order); City of Eugene v. Miller, 871 P.2d 454, 460 (Or. 1994) (discussing
public health); R.K.O. Pictures v. Hissong, 123 N.E.2d 441, 448 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1954) (discussing public morals).

2018]

LIMITING FREE SPEECH TO PROTECT CHILDREN

327

prohibition on a form of speech, a court must consider the extent
and scope of the government’s police powers.
The First Amendment’s scope generally forbids the government
from prohibiting either (1) a form of speech; or (2) the expression
of an idea, simply out of mere aversion to the form of speech or
towards the idea being expressed.36 As such, the United States
Supreme Court has often attempted to determine the protections of
the First Amendment in relation to American societal values.
In Texas v. Johnson, the United States Supreme Court was
presented with a novel First Amendment question that serves as an
example of the conflict between upholding societal values and
preserving the First Amendment.37 Respondent Gregory Lee
Johnson was charged with desecration of a venerable object—
burning the United States flag—in violation of section 42.09(a)(3)
of the Texas Penal Code.38 After the defendant’s conviction was
reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.39 The Court found that the
burning of the flag constituted protected expressive conduct,
despite going to great lengths to note the importance and reverence
commonly afforded to the United States flag.40 In the majority
opinion, Justice Brennan explained, “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”41 The United States
Supreme Court has often attempted to determine the protections of
the First Amendment in relation to American societal values.42
36. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 470 (2017) (citing Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989)); see Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 601, 615 (1971)
(“[M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of [the
First Amendment’s] constitutional freedoms.”).
37. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 402. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Defendant’s case since the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals ruled that the Texas
statue was, “unconstitutional as applied to him,” and therefore, further inquiry was
required to determine whether the Texas statute was unconstitutional on its face.
Id.
40. See id. at 406 (“The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was
both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.”).
41. Id. at 414 (citation omitted).
42. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (discussing
that our society, like other societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
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Because societal values alone cannot be determinative, in-depth
analysis and interpretation of the statute at issue is required.43
2. Constitutional Limitations: Facial and As-Applied Challenges
The legislative branch possesses the power to enact criminal
statutes and, therefore, the power to determine the criminality of
certain acts.44 However, a variety of constitutional principles exist to
serve as limits to the legislature’s power to create law.45 These limits,
found in both the United States Constitution and individual state
constitutions, represent a large portion of the “checks” the judicial
branch holds over the legislative branch.46 Where a statute is
content-neutral,47 its constitutionality determinations are “tempered
by the general principle that statutes carry a presumption of
constitutionality.”48 On the contrary, when a statute restricts speech
on a content-basis, the government possesses the burden to
demonstrate the statute’s constitutionality.49

benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality”).
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, 7 MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW
& PROCEDURE § 1:12 (4th ed. 2017).
45. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Uses and Abuses of Incumbency: People v.
Ohrenstein and the Limits of Inherent Legislative Power, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 217,
236–
40 (1991) (discussing the constitutional limitations placed in inherent
congressional power).
46. See id. § 1:11 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)) (“Courts have
an important duty, often unpopular when fulfilled, to hold the legislature within
Constitutional bounds.”).
47. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 48 (1987) (“Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to the
content or communicative impact of the message conveyed.”).
48. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 44, § 1:12. See also, e.g., State v. Fairmont
Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 150, 202 N.W. 714, 716 (1925) (“There is a strong
presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of
its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience,
and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.”); In re Haggerty,
448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989) (“Minnesota statutes are presumed
constitutional, and . . . [the Court’s] power to declare a statute unconstitutional
should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.”
(citing City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, 276 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn.1979))).
49. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 44, § 1:12 (citing Kismet Inv’rs, Inc. v. Cty of
Benton, 617 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)).
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There are two ways the constitutionality of a duly-enacted statute
may be constitutionally challenged pertinent to the subject matter of
this article.50 The first type, a “facial challenge,” contends that the
statute is unconstitutional on its face.51 In a facial challenge, parties
seek to assert not only their own constitutional rights but also the
rights of others adversely impacted by the challenged statute.52 In
plain terms, a facial challenge contends that the specific statute is
unconstitutional in all its potential applications.53 Facial challenges
are rare due to this high threshold.54
The second type, an “as-applied challenge,” may be brought
when the plaintiff alleges that the statute is unconstitutional given
his or her unique situation.55 As-applied challenges require the
plaintiff to show the statute is unconstitutional as applied to himself
or herself, and are necessarily more fact-sensitive.56 In Muccio, the
defendant moved to dismiss her charge under section 609.352,
arguing that the statute facially violated the First Amendment.57 The
defendant challenged the facial overbreadth of the statute because,
in her contention, it prohibited speech protected by the First
Amendment.58

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 36, § 137 (citing Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486
F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007)).
53. Id. (“[A] ‘facial challenge’ to a law is a challenge based on a contention
that the law, by its own terms, always operates unconstitutionally.” (citing Tex.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995))); see also Project
Vote v. Kelly, 805 F. Supp. 2d 152, 184 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (stating that a facial
challenge to a statute concerns the constitutional rights of society as a whole, rather
than the rights of the parties before the court).
54. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 36, § 137 (noting that facial challenges are also
disfavored for a variety of reasons); see Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (“Claims of facial invalidity often rest on
speculation . . . . Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle
of judicial restraint that courts should neither ‘anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
55. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 36, § 137.
56. See id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 882 (N.D. Ill.
2014)) (“In a facial constitutional challenge, individual application facts do not
matter.” (citation omitted)).
57. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. 2017).
58. Id.
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The Overbreadth Doctrine

As a general rule, a statute is overbroad if it prohibits a
substantial amount of protected speech at the expense of a person’s
constitutionally-protected rights.59 An unsupported assertion of
overbreadth will not suffice.60 In particular, the overbreadth
doctrine is applicable in cases containing First Amendment
challenges.61 The doctrine is commonly raised and cited by
individuals in hopes to shift “the focus of the litigation from the
alleged criminal to the law itself . . . from the actual conduct of the
defendant to the hypothetical conduct of others.”62
The overbreadth doctrine possesses a unique quality: it is not
applicable if the statute presents no violation of First Amendment
rights.63 Under the overbreadth doctrine, an individual may
challenge a statute because it also affects the rights of others not
before the court.64 However, a court will invalidate a statute only if
its overbreadth is “substantial.”65 The following two cases help
illustrate contrasting applications of the doctrine.

59. See, e.g., City of Hous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (citing New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)) (“A statute should only be overturned as facially
overbroad when the statute’s overbreadth is substantial.”); State v. Machholz, 574
N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d
735, 740 (Minn. 1981)).
60. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 6:6.
61. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); Dombrowksi v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
62. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 6:4 (emphasis omitted) (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963)).
63. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 36, § 137 (citing Fisher v. Iowa Bd. Of
Optometry Exam’rs, 510 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa 1994)).
64. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (citing
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)). In particular, facial
challenges under the overbreadth doctrine are available for those who choose to
engage in legally protected expressions but may refrain from doing so rather than
risk prosecution. Id.
65. Id. (quoting City of Hous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458–59 (1987)). As the
Court explains in Board of Airport Commissioners, the requirement that the
overbreadth be substantial arose from the recognition that “the overbreadth
doctrine is, ‘manifestly, strong medicine.’” Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). Furthermore, the Court explained, “there must be a realistic
danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially
challenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. (quoting Members of City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)).
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While invalidation of a statute due to facial overbreadth is
uncommon, courts have, at times, held statutes unconstitutionally
invalid for overbreadth.66 In Board of Airport Commissioners of L.A. v.
Jews for Jesus, for example, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a regulation which prohibited a religious minister from
distributing free religious literature at the Los Angeles International
Airport.67 The regulation at issue sought to prohibit all forms of
protected expressions.68 In essence, this created a “First Amendment
Free Zone” at the airport.69 The Court reasoned that the ban was
overbroad since the language of the regulation expressly applied to
“all First Amendment activities” taking place at the airport.70 The
Court saw the ban on all forms of protected expression to be an
unjustifiably and substantially over-broad restriction on speech
protected by the First Amendment.71 Therefore, the Court held that
the regulation violated the First Amendment.72
In State v. Hensel, a resident of Little Falls, Minnesota, attempted
to sit in a restricted area of a city council meeting.73 The State of
Minnesota subsequently charged the defendant with disorderly

66. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618 (1973) (holding that a statute will not
be unconstitutionally overbroad just because “arguably protected conduct may or
may not be caught or chilled by the statute.”); State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415,
419 (Minn. 1998) (“A statute should only be overturned as facially overbroad when
the statute’s overbreadth is substantial . . . because the overbreadth doctrine has the
potential to void an entire statute, it should be applied ‘only as a last resort’ and
only if the degree of overbreadth is substantial and the statute is not subject to a
limiting construction.”).
67. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs, 482 U.S. at 574–76.
68. Id. at 574.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 575. Additionally, the Court held the regulation was necessarily
overbroad because the words, “First Amendment activities” left no room for a
narrowed construction. Id. A narrowing construction of regulatory or statutory
language can potentially prevent substantial overbreadth. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360, 378–79 (1964) (concluding that given the lack of any limiting
construction, the statutes at issues could be held unconstitutional on their face
under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine).
71. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs, 482 U.S. at 576.
72. Id. at 577.
73. 874 N.W.2d 245, 248–49 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 901 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 2017). The author realizes the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision is no
longer good law. However, information about the Court of Appeals’ decision is still
included in this Note to illustrate application of the facial overbreadth doctrine,
particularly in Minnesota.
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conduct, a violation of section 609.72, subdivision 1(2).74 On appeal,
the defendant-appellant contended that the statute is facially
overbroad since it proscribed her ability to engage in expressive
conduct at city council meetings open to the public.75 In order to
succeed on her facial overbreadth challenge, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals explained that the defendant “must establish that no set
of circumstances exist[] under which [the statute] would be valid,
that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep, or that a
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged
in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”76 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the statute was not facially
overbroad because even although there are “marginal applications
in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values,
facial invalidation is inappropriate if the remainder of
the statute covers a whole range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable conduct.”77 In essence, though the
statute could infringe on some forms of speech and conduct
protected by the First Amendment, the court did not find the statute
to be facially invalid.78
When determining the potential overbreadth of a statute, courts
often weigh competing societal interests.79 The following section
discusses forms of speech not protected by the First Amendment.
Statutes which partially prohibit unprotected speech may still fall
under scrutiny from the overbreadth doctrine.80
4.

Unprotected Speech: Obscene Speech and Speech Integral to
Criminal Conduct

The First Amendment does not grant United States citizens the
absolute right to free speech in all forms.81 The United States

74. Id. at 253. The statute proscribes disturbances of meetings, which could
include speaking out of turn, heckling, shouting, chanting, and other forms of oral
protest. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.72, subdiv. 1(2) (2016)).
75. See id. at 252–53.
76. Id. at 250 (alteration in original) (quoting Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d
764, 778 (Minn. 2014)).
77. Id. at 255 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974)).
78. Id.
79. SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 6:6 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112
(1973)).
80. See, e.g., State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. 2017).
81. HUDSON, supra note 23, § 3:1.
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Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment’s
protections are not absolute and that the government may regulate
certain categories of expression.82 In Virginia v. Black, the
Commonwealth of Virginia passed legislation that outlawed crossburnings “with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons.”83 The United States Supreme Court affirmed its past
rulings on areas of “unprotected speech,” and held that the portion
of the statute banning cross burning with the intent to intimidate
did not violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
speech.84 The Court reasoned that
cross-burning could be
viewed as intimidating speech, which is a type of “true threat” where
a speaker “directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm.”85 The Black Court
asserted that the government may proscribe “true threat” speech so
long as there is “an intent to intimidate.”86 Aside from speech that
constitutes a “true threat,” other forms of speech have been held to
be outside the protection of the First Amendment.
In Miller v. California, the United States Supreme Court
enunciated a controlling standard for another unprotected category
of speech: obscene speech.87 In Miller, the defendant-appellant was
convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in
violation of a California statute.88 The United States Supreme Court
used cases like Miller to revisit previous standards on obscene
speech.89 In order for a form of speech to be obscene and outside
82. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (asserting that the United
States Supreme Court has “long recognized” that the government may regulate
certain forms of harmful speech so long as the regulation is “consistent with the
Constitution”); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”).
83. 538 U.S. at 343.
84. Id. at 343–48.
85. Id. at 360. “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. at 359
(citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
86. Id. at 362.
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 16. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the “States
have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene
material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of
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the protection of the First Amendment, the Miller Court
implemented a three-part test for all courts to determine whether
speech is obscene.90 The Court held that the defendant-appellant’s
conduct could be regulated in affirmation of this standard.91 The
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller is affirmed by later
cases in which the Court affords great protection to minors when
obscene material is involved.92
Similar to obscene speech, the First Amendment does not
protect “speech integral to criminal conduct.”93 In United States v.
Williams, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a
federal statute criminalizing “offers to provide or requests to obtain”
child pornography.94 The Court concluded that the statute
prohibited speech integral to criminal conduct because the statute
prohibited offers to provide or obtain illegal material.95 Therefore,
offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles” (the
“Miller test”). Id. at 18–19; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969)
(explaining the danger of obscene material “fall[ing] into the hands of children”
or “intrud[ing] upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public”); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“The well-being of its children is of course a
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.”); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (holding that a legitimate state interest exists to prohibit
dissemination or exhibition of obscene material to children).
90. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”).
91. Id. at 36–37. The Court realized adoption of this standard to be necessary
since, “the inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision
altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then ‘hard
core’ pornography may be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and
the consenting adult alike.” Id. at 28.
92. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). In State
v. Muccio, in addition to the obscene speech prohibited by section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2), the court recognized that the statute also prohibits
communications that include child pornography. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914,
925 (Minn. 2017). Child pornography is also considered unprotected speech. See
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982).
93. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It
rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute.”).
94. 553 U.S. 285, 297–98, 307 (2008).
95. Id. at 298 (“Offers to provide or requests to obtain unlawful material,
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the First Amendment did not protect the speech criminalized by the
federal statute.96 The Court explained that speech integral to
criminal conduct consists of proposals to engage in illegal activities
but not the mere advocacy of criminal acts.97
Likewise, in State v. Washington-Davis, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a statute prohibiting the promotion of prostitution
was constitutional because the statute’s regulation of speech was
narrowly focused on speech integral to criminal conduct.98 The
Court noted its holding in United States v. Williams that “[s]peech is
integral to criminal conduct when it “is intended to induce or
commence illegal activities,”99 like “conspiracy, incitement, and
solicitation.”100 Since the statute at issue in Washington-Davis
prohibited the solicitation and inducement of an individual to
practice prostitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded the
speech at issue was designed to facilitate the commission of a
crime.101 In both Williams and Washington-Davis, the United States
and Minnesota Supreme Courts found that the statute in question
sought to prohibit speech that is integral to criminal conduct.102
5.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and States’ Statutory Efforts
to Prohibit Sexual Conduct Involving Minors

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court invalidated a
provision of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.103 The
Court found the Act’s prohibition on sexually explicit images which
“appear to depict [human] minors but were produced by means
other than using real children” substantially burdens speech

whether as part of a commercial exchange or not, are similarly undeserving of First
Amendment protection.”).
96. See id. at 304 (explaining that there is no First Amendment exception to
this prohibition).
97. See id. at 298–99 (“[T]here remains an important distinction between a
proposal to engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of illegality.”).
98. 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn. 2016) (“The statute’s focus on speech directly
related to criminal behavior . . . .” is clear and, therefore, its prohibition is
constitutional).
99. Williams, 553 U.S. at 298.
100. Id.
101. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 538.
102. Id.; Williams, 553 U.S. at 298.
103. 535 U.S. 234 (2002); see generally Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2008) (defining child pornography).
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protected by the First Amendment.104 In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy explained that the causal link between the speech
prohibited by the statute and the potential, later criminal activity was
“contingent and indirect”105 and “depends upon some unquantified
potential for subsequent criminal acts.”106 Justice Kennedy
concluded that the speech prohibited by the statute was protected
by the First Amendment.107 The distinction drawn in Ashcroft
factored into the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Muccio.108
Throughout the past decade, a number of states have enacted
statutes prohibiting sexual conduct with children via various
electronic communication methods.109 These statutes seek to protect
children from sexual exploitation and the resulting emotional,
physical, and psychological harms.110 Many states have enacted
statutes specifically related to the transmission of sexually explicit
material to children via electronic means.111 Minnesota’s statute
prohibiting solicitation of children to engage in sexual conduct,
Section 609.352, parallels the efforts of these states.112 State statutes
similar to the Minnesota statute have withstood constitutional
challenges.113 In Muccio, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced a

104. Ashcroft, 535 U.S at 239; see also id. at 253 (“First Amendment freedoms are
most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws
for that impermissible end.”).
105. See id. at 250. The images proscribed by the statute “can lead to actual
instances of child abuse” and “the causal link is contingent and indirect.” Id. “The
harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some
unqualified potential for subsequent criminal acts” Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 256.
108. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 924 (Minn. 2017).
109. See generally Benjamin J. Vernia, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of State Statutes or Ordinances Regulating Sexual Performance by Child, 42
A.L.R. 5th 291 (1996) (discussing the implications of state statutes attempting to
prohibit sexual conduct involving children through various means).
110. See id. § 1[a] (“A number of jurisdictions have rules, regulations,
constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments directly bearing upon this
subject.”).
111. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-111(a) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2009);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145c (2013).
112. See 15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 264 (2017) (identifying MINN.
STAT. § 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) (2016) as an example of a state statute that prohibits
the electronic transmission of sexualized material to children).
113. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2006); People v. Fraser, 752
N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 2001).
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constitutional challenge to section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2).114 In
Muccio, the court considered two main constitutional inquiries.115
First, whether section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) was
unconstitutionally overbroad.116 Second, whether the transmission
of sexually explicit material to a child is a form of speech protected
by the First Amendment.117
III. THE MUCCIO DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

In November 2014, a father called law enforcement to report he
had located inappropriate photographs on his fifteen-year-old son’s
iPad.118 These photographs showed “a female’s bare genitals, a
female naked from the neck to below the waist, and a female’s
buttocks covered by a thong.”119 Forty-one-year-old respondent,
Krista Muccio, sent the fifteen-year-old these photos via a direct
message on the social photo-sharing platform, Instagram.120
Additionally, Muccio and the fifteen-year-old exchanged sexually
explicit text messages.121 In these text messages, Muccio and the boy
described the sexual acts they wished to perform on each other.122
As a result of the content of the photographs and text messages
exchanged, the State of Minnesota charged Muccio with felony
communication with a child describing sexual conduct in violation
of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2).123 The district court dismissed
this charge and concluded that the statute “is facially overbroad

114. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. 2017).
115. Id. at 919.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 918.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The State of Minnesota also charged Muccio with one count of felony
possession of child pornography in violation of section 617.247, subdivision 4(a). Id.
The district court concluded sufficient evidence existed to establish probable cause
for this count. Id. at 918 n.1. However, the district court stayed Muccio’s trial
proceedings pending the State’s appeal of the district court ruling on the count of
felony communication with a child in violation of section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2). Id.
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under the First Amendment and therefore unconstitutional.”124 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.125
The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently granted the State’s
petition for review to determine if the district court properly
dismissed Muccio’s charge of felony communication with a child.126
B.

A Brief Overview of Section 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2)’s Text

Much of the Muccio decision centers around the plain meaning
of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) which prohibits “[a] person 18
years of age or older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer
program, computer network, computer system, an electronic
communications system, or a telecommunications, wire, or radio
communications system, or other electronic device capable of
electronic data storage or transmission . . .” from “engaging in
communication with a child or someone the person reasonably
believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct.”127 The
Muccio court defines certain phrases of the text in order to help
determine the section’s sweep.128 The court defined sexual conduct
as “sexual contact of the individual’s primary genital area, sexual
penetration . . . or sexual performance.”129 The Court defined the
term “engaging in communication with a child” as “[the
requirement that] the adult direct[s] the prohibited content at a
child.”130 Additionally, the Muccio court explained that
“communication” means “an act or instance of transmitting.” The
definitions of these textual terms had great significance when
determining the constitutionality of the statute.131

124. Id. at 918.
125. State v. Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 890
N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017).
126. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 919.
127. MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) (2016).
128. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 919.
129. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 609.341 (2016) (defining sexual penetration);
MINN. STAT. § 617.246 (2016) (defining sexual performance).
130. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 919. Importantly, for an adult to “direct the content
at a child,” the Muccio court held that the adult “must take some affirmative act to
specifically select or designate the child as a recipient of the transmission.” Id.
“Engage” is defined by the Muccio court using its dictionary definition, “to take part:
participate.” See also Engage, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 383 (10th
ed. 2001).
131. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 919–26.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

Arguing before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the State
asserted that section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is constitutional
because it only targets unprotected speech, any overbreadth is
unsubstantial, and it is subject to a limiting interpretation that
preserves its constitutionality.132 Muccio countered the State’s
argument by contending that the statute burdens a “substantial
amount” of protected speech and is therefore “unconstitutional on
its face.”133 The court agreed with the State’s argument and reversed
the lower courts’ decisions.134 The court held that although the
statute regulates some speech protected by the First Amendment,
the speech regulated by the statute is not “substantially overbroad”
in relation to its “plainly legitimate sweep” and therefore, does not
violate the First Amendment.135
The court addressed three main issues: (1) the plain meaning
of the language used in the statute; (2) whether the statute prohibits
speech that the First Amendment protects; and (3) whether the
statute’s prohibitions burden a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech.136 On the first main issue, the
court reached three conclusions regarding the plain meaning of
section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2). The court based its
determination that the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad
on the statute’s plain meaning.137 The interpretation of a statute’s
plain meaning must be in accord with the legislature’s intent.138 In
summary, the court determined that the statute “prohibits an adult
from participating in the electronic transmission of information
relating to or describing the sexual conduct of any person, if the
communication was directed at a child, and the adult sending the

132. Id. In the alternative, the State argued that the statute is constitutional
because it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at
919.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 920.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The plain meaning of statutory language is determined by giving words
of the statute their “common and approved usage.” See MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subdiv.
1 (2016) (identifying the proper standard that courts should employ in engaging in
plain-meaning analysis of statutes).
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communication acted with specific intent to arouse the sexual desire
of any person.”139
With the plain meaning of the statute established, the court
then examined whether the statute prohibits speech protected by
the First Amendment.140 In the State’s view, the statute did not
prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment since the statute
regulates speech integral to criminal conduct and obscene speech.141
In opposition to the State’s viewpoint, Muccio argued that the
speech regulated by the statute is neither integral to criminal
conduct, nor obscene speech.142 According to Muccio, the statute
regulated First Amendment protected speech.143 The argument
whether the statute regulates obscene speech is discussed later in this
article.
To determine if section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) prohibited
speech protected by the First Amendment, the court’s first line of
analysis centered around whether the speech at issue was integral to
criminal conduct.144 With the plain meaning of the statute previously
established,145 the court offered a discussion about the
“grooming”146 process and its relation to the speech that is
prohibited by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2).147 In doing so, the
139. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 922.
140. Id. at 923.
141. See id. (discussing “speech integral to criminal conduct”); see also Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16–19, 24, 36–
37 (1973) (discussing obscene speech); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567
(1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–43 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
142. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 923.
143. Id.
144. Id. “First Amendment protections do not extend to speech used ‘as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.’ Speech is integral
to criminal conduct when it ‘is intended to induce or commence illegal activities.’”
Id. (first quoting State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn. 2016); then
quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008)).
145. See generally MINN. STAT. § 609.341 (2016); MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subdiv.
2a(2) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 617.246 (2016); Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 919–26; State v.
Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 890 N.W.2d. 914 (Minn.
2017).
146. Grooming presents unique dangers due to its proximity to criminal child
sexual abuse. See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“‘Child sexual abuse is often effectuated following a period of “grooming” and the
sexualization of the relationship.’” (quoting Sana Loue, Legal and Epidemiological
Aspects of Child Maltreatment, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 471, 479 (1998))).
147. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 923, 924.
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court described grooming as “a process sexual predators use to
shape a child’s perspective and lower the child’s inhibitions with
respect to later criminal sexual acts.”148 Importantly, the Muccio court
stated that the grooming process often “increases the likelihood that
[a] child will cooperate with the adult and reduces the likelihood
that [a] child will disclose the adult’s wrongful acts.”149 For this
reason, the court agreed with the State’s viewpoint.150 The court
concluded that much of the speech prohibited by the statute is
integral to criminal conduct because the prohibited speech is often
used to solicit sexual conduct from a specific child.151 With the
matter of “speech integral to criminal conduct” under the statute
purportedly resolved, the court next turned to analyzing whether the
speech regulated by the statute was obscene.152
Similar to speech integral to criminal conduct, the First
Amendment does not protect obscene speech.153 To determine
whether the speech regulated by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2)
was obscene, the court employed the test delineated by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller v. California.154 Under the three
148. Id. (citing Daniel Pollack & Andrea MacIver, Understanding Sexual Grooming
in Child Abuse Cases, 34 Child L. Prac. 161, 161 (2015)).
149. Id. at 924 (citing Pollack & MacIver, supra note 148, at 166); see id. (“After
desensitizing the child to sexual content, the offender typically solicits the child to
engage in some type of sexual conduct that may include sexual intercourse, sex
trafficking, or child pornography.”).
150. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (“We agree
with the State that when grooming is done for the purpose of later using the child
in sexual conduct, it resembles solicitation of the child, and under Williams, such
solicitation falls outside First Amendment protections.”).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 925.
153. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (footnote omitted) (“That
conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.”); see also 16A AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 36, § 524
(footnote omitted) (“Indeed, speech that is obscene may be constitutionally
proscribed because the social interest in order and morality outweighs the
negligible contribution of those categories of speech to the marketplace of ideas.”).
154. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 925. For a full quotation of the Miller test, see supra
note 89 and accompanying text. Significantly, when the Miller test is applied to
speech directed toward children, the United States Supreme Court has given
deference to statutes which protect minors from the influence of literature, even if
the literature is not obscene by adult standards. See Sable Commc’ns Comm, Inc. v.
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prongs of the Miller test, the court concluded the speech of the
statute appeals to the prurient interest, depicts sexual acts in a
patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.155 With the successful fulfillment of the Miller
standard, the court concluded that much of the speech regulated by
the statute is considered obscene speech.156
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that even
though the speech regulated by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is
often obscene or integral to criminal conduct, the possibility that the
statute regulated some forms of speech protected by the First
Amendment still possessed some merit.157 Accordingly, the court
needed to address whether the statute regulates a substantial amount
of speech protected by the First Amendment.158 The court explained
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
155. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 925 (“We have noted that the [United States]
Supreme Court has defined a ‘prurient interest’ in sex as a ‘morbid, shameful
interest in sex.’”); see also State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Minn. 1992) (stating
sexual desire between an adult and a child is a “shameful interest in sex”) The court
found the communication regulated by the statute to be patently offensive since the
plain meaning of the statute requires the speech to be directed at a child and made
with the intent to arouse sexual desire. Id. Furthermore, the court in Muccio refers
to MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–45 (2016) and notes that, statutorily, “[i]t is a crime for
an adult to engage in any sexual conduct with a child.” Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 926.
Additionally, since the plain meaning of the statute requires the prohibited
communication be made with the “intent to arouse,” the court found that many of
the communications within the statute will lack the requisite literary, artistic,
political, or scientific merit required by the test. Id. Lastly, the court notes that it is
“difficult to envision a scenario in which an adult’s sexually explicit online
communication with a child younger than 16, made with the intent to arouse or
satisfy either party’s sexual desire, would ever be found to have redeeming social
value.” Id. (quoting Scott v. State, 788 S.E.2d 468, 476 (Ga. 2016)).
156. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 927.
157. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 927 (finding it necessary to perform an analysis of
speech under the statute that may be protected by the First Amendment due to the
argument presented by Muccio); see State v. Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2016) (highlighting that before the Minnesota Court of Appeals, Muccio
successfully argued that the statute would prohibit large swaths of speech with
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value), rev’d, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017).
158. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 923 (reasoning that the requirement that the
overbreadth of a statute be substantial “stems from the underlying justification for
the overbreadth exception itself—the interest in preventing an invalid statute from
inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court”); see United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (identifying speech integral to criminal
conduct as a category of speech the First Amendment does not protect); Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984).
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the statute only prohibits speech in a narrow set of circumstances.159
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the principles outlined by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Williams to reach
its conclusion.160
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the statute is most
similar to the statute upheld in Williams because “the vast majority of
the [Williams statute’s] applications” were constitutional restrictions
on speech integral to criminal conduct.161 Likewise, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the statute should survive the
constitutional challenge as well because it mainly applied to speech
integral to criminal conduct.162 Therefore, the statute did not

159. In Muccio, the Minnesota Supreme Court identifies two main provisions of
the statute which limit the statute’s sweep. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 926. First, the
statute requires an adult to direct the communication at a child. Id. In the court’s
opinion, “non-targeted mass Internet communications,” such as “music videos,
advertisements, and television series,” would not fall within the scope of the statute’s
regulation. Id. Second, the statute requires the adult to act with specific intent to
arouse the sexual desire of any person. Id. The forms of media cited by Muccio (songs
by Miley Cyrus or Game of Thrones, for example) would not fall within the scope of
the statute because the adult creating these forms of media would not be acting with
the intent required by the statute. Id. at 926–27; cf. United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d
1200, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a statute was not substantially
overbroad because it regulated speech outside the scope of those categories of
unprotected speech).
160. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 927.
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303 (2008)).
162. See id. at 928. However, although the Williams Court held that the statute at
issue was not facially invalid, it still held that “as-applied” challenges could be
brought regarding this statute—to the extent that protected speech was shown to
fall within the statute’s sweep. Id. at 927; see Williams, 553 U.S. at 302.
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prohibit a substantial163 amount of speech protected by the First
Amendment.164
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Correctly Determined the Speech
Prohibited by Section 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) is Not Generally
Protected by the First Amendment

The holdings of Williams165 and Washington-Davis166 established
that the First Amendment does not protect speech that facilitates the
commission of a crime167 or commences illegal activities, such as
“conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation.”168 In Muccio, the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the speech prohibited
by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is similar to the permissibly
prohibited speech of Williams and Washington-Davis.169 Muccio
163. In this statutory instance, the term “substantial” does not specifically
require the content of prohibited speech to lack literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Compare Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 927 (“[T]he statute does not
specifically require that the content . . . lack literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“A state offense must also
be limited to works which . . . do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”). However, this definition is not without restrictions. See Muccio,
890 N.W.2d at 927–28 (stating that non-obscene speech that is not categorically
unprotected speech is protected by the First Amendment); see also Miller, 413 U.S.
at 23–24 (“We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to
regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited.”). The Minnesota Supreme Court viewed the
statute in Muccio favorably because it possessed a specific intent requirement that
ensures it does not prohibit speech in the form of discussions about “safe sexual
practices [or] artistic images that include nude subjects . . . .” Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at
928 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997)).
164. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 929 (“Given the relatively few protected
communications that the statute regulates, we hold that MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd.
2a(2) is not substantially overbroad.”).
165. Williams, 553 U.S. at 299.
166. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn. 2016).
167. Williams, 553 U.S. at 300; id. at 538 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
168. Williams, 553 U.S. at 298. See generally W.R. Habeeb, Annotation,
Construction and Effect of Statutes Making Solicitation to Commit Crime a Substantive
Offense, 51 A.L.R.2d 953 (1957) (discussing the common law history that makes
solicitation to commit a crime a substantive offense).
169. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 924; see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 299 (holding that
speech offering to provide or requesting to obtain child pornography is excluded
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correctly applies previous United States Supreme Court and
Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) requires
an adult to direct communication relating to or describing sexual
conduct at a child with the specific intent to arouse the sexual desire
of any person.170 The Minnesota Supreme Court believed that this
specific intent requirement distinguished section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2) from other statutes that criminalize the
transmission of indecent messages in broader terms.171
The holdings of Williams and Washington-Davis offer persuasive
support for the statute at issue in Muccio.172 The statute’s language
satisfies the Williams standard since the speech contained in section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2) directly relates to the solicitation of a
child to engage in illegal conduct.173 Likewise, the statute’s language
satisfies the Washington-Davis standard because the statutory
language itself prohibits speech that often leads to later coercion of
the child to engage in sexual conduct with the adult.174 For a
determination of a statute’s potential overbreadth, it should not
matter whether a party can offer some possible impermissible
applications of the statute.175 Facial invalidation due to overbreadth
from First Amendment protections); Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 538 (holding
that speech promoting and soliciting prostitution, or “speech that is directly linked
to and designed to facilitate the commission of a crime,” is excluded from First
Amendment protections).
170. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 922.
171. Id. at 928. The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguishes section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2) from the federal statute in Reno. Id. The federal statute in Reno
contained no specific requirement that the indecent messages be transmitted with
the specific intent to arouse sexual desires. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 859–60 (1997). The Reno Court invalidated the statute since the
speech regulated by its scope could include, “discussions about prison rape or safe
sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card
catalogue of the Carnegie Library.” Id. at 878. In contrast, the specific intent
requirement of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) allows the regulation of matters
solely intended to arouse the sexual desire of its intended recipient, a child. See
Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 928.
172. See Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 924.
173. Id. (citing Williams, 553 U.S. at 298).
174. Id. (citing Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 538).
175. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)); see also Bushco v. Shurtleff, 729 F.3d 1294
(10th Cir. 2013) (“Under First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, ‘a statute is
facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.’ However,
‘the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute
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is appropriate only when the statute covers a wide range of
constitutionally protected speech.176 As such, the citizenry’s right to
freedom of speech in these types of circumstances is still preserved
by the availability of as-applied challenges.177
Given the potentially wide range of sexualized subject matter
covered by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2), it is quite possible
certain groups could attempt to bring an as-applied challenge to this
statute. Consider, for example, an LGBT interest group that seeks to
encourage adolescent LGBT persons to be confident in their identity
as LGBT individuals. The interest group believes that LGBT
adolescents should feel the same pride in their bodies, and comfort
with their sexuality, that their straight peers do. The interest group
may choose to distribute informational pamphlets to these
individuals. Such pamphlets would be directed at children, they
could concern the subject of one’s sexual identity, and potentially
even depict some aspects of LGBT sexual performance. The
pamphlets may even excite sexual arousal in these adolescents.
Under section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2), it is possible this
interest group may face criminal prosecution for the publication of
these pamphlets. However, the Muccio decision notes the availability
of as-applied challenges in appropriate situations, such as this.178 In
the case of this hypothetical LGBT interest group, an as-applied
challenge would pose an intriguing test of section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2), though the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on such a case. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is not facially overbroad and
does not limit a substantial amount of protected speech, as-applied
challenges are still permitted in the event that this law presents a
genuine constitutional issue to a specific party, such as the
hypothetical LGBT interest group.

is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’”).
176. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–70 n.25 (1982) (providing that
“facial invalidation is inappropriate if the remainder of the statute covers a whole
range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct” and noting
that invalidation of a statute for substantial overbreadth is “strong medicine” that
should be used “only as a last resort”); Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 540 (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1973)).
177. See Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 928–29 (“Those communications that fall within
this narrow sliver of speech will be sufficiently limited [so] that they may be
protected through as-applied challenges.”).
178. Id. at 927 (citation omitted).
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Nevertheless, since section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) was held
to be overbroad by the Muccio court, it was necessary for the court to
provide a limiting interpretation of the statute that substantially
reduces the statute’s scope.179 The majority opinion of Muccio
presents a solid, cogent argument that, on the whole, speech
prohibited by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is speech integral to
criminal conduct and generally outside the protection of the First
Amendment.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision is Correctly Distinguished
from the United States Supreme Court Decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition
As previously mentioned, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition180 the
United States Supreme Court faced a challenge from an association
of businesses that produced “adult-oriented materials.”181 The
challenged statute prohibited, in certain circumstances, the
possession or distribution of pornographic images, which may be
created by using adults who look like minors or by using computer
imaging.182 The Court’s holding seems at odds with the Muccio
decision, as the Court held the link between the prohibition of these
materials and later criminal activity to be “contingent” and
“indirect.”183
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the speech
regulated by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) distinguishable from
the regulated speech in Ashcroft.184 When an adult sends sexual
communications to a child with the specific intent to arouse sexual
desire, what often follows is criminal in nature.185 This type of
179. See State v. Babson, 326 P.3d 559, 570 (Or. 2014) (“If a statute is overbroad,
the court then must determine whether it can be interpreted to avoid
such overbreadth.”).
180. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
181. Id.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1996).
183. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 236.
184. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 925 (Minn. 2017).
185. Id.; see Pollack & MacIver, supra note 148, at 161 (“In many child sexual
abuse cases, the abuse is preceded by sexual grooming. Sexual grooming is a
preparatory process in which a perpetrator gradually gains a person’s or
organization’s trust with the intent to be sexually abusive.”). The article authored
by Pollack and MacIver lists a variety of behaviors sexual predators may engage in
during the grooming process; these include “showing the child sexually explicit
images.” Id.
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behavior is associated with the grooming process used by sexual
predators to gain the trust of children and potentially exploit the
target child for future criminal perpetration.186 Since the sexual
communications regulated by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) are
directly related to the grooming process and by extension child
abuse, the causal link between the communications and later
criminal activity is not “indirect” in comparison to the speech
regulated in Ashcroft.187 The apt distinction drawn by the Minnesota
Supreme Court between Ashcroft and Muccio effectively preserved the
constitutionality of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2).188
C.

Implications of the Muccio Decision: The Danger of Grooming

The speech at issue in Muccio should be prohibited due to the
danger it presents to a particularly vulnerable group in our society:
children.189 In Muccio, an amicus curiae brief was filed to the
Minnesota Supreme Court by the Minnesota Coalition Against
Sexual Assault (MNCASA).190 In the brief, MNCASA explains the
Minnesota Legislature’s intent in drafting and enacting section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2).191 MNCASA’s brief stressed that the
186. See Pollack & MacIver, supra note 148, at 165; see also Andiry Pazuniak, A
Better Way to Stop Online Predators: Encouraging a More Appealing Approach to § 2422(b),
40 SETON HALL L. REV. 691, 716 (2010) (stating that courts have often recognized
this danger and noted the government’s interest in preventing pedophiles from
“grooming” minors for future sexual encounters).
187. See Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 925.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 924; see also State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn.
2016) (holding that a statute criminalizing speech that was “directly linked to and
designed to facilitate the commission of a crime” prohibited speech that was integral
to criminal conduct).
190. Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 1 (“MNCASA is a nonprofit
organization supported by public and private funds. MNCASA represents over 60
sexual assault victim advocacy programs statewide. Its member programs and allies
also include health care providers, community groups, nonprofit organizations,
professional groups, and members of law enforcement agencies. MNCASA
represents the concerns of these stakeholders in matters of public policy, media
outreach, prevention awareness, and community organizing around issues of sexual
violence.”).
191. Id. at 12 (“The legislature has a compelling state interest in protecting
children from the harm caused by adult sexual predators. With the increased access
to children by adults via the Internet, the legislature sought to expand protections
commiserate with the expanded access. The amicus contends that the legislative
intent was not to criminalize all grooming behaviors. The intent was to criminalize
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Minnesota Supreme Court uphold section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2) in large part due to the danger of grooming, a new form of
sexual exploitation.192
The advent of new forms of electronic communication193 has
given rise to new and greater opportunities for criminal conduct.194
These forms of electronic communication pose a significant threat
to society since they can be used to coerce, solicit, or entice
individuals to perform illegal activities with little or no face-to-face
human interaction.195 In MNCASA’s amicus curiae brief, the
coalition argues that the speech prohibited by section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2) is a form of communication that can be related to
a dangerous process called “grooming.”196 Grooming is a process
used by sexual predators to shape a child victim’s perspective and
lower the child’s inhibitions with respect to later criminal sexual
acts.197 When grooming is done for the purpose of later engaging
the child in sexual conduct, it is, unequivocally, speech integral to
criminal conduct.198 Section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is a

specific grooming behaviors that harmed children and to stop an adult sexual
predator before the harm escalated from online harmful communications to inperson harmful behavior.”).
192. Id.
193. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2150(12) (2002) (“‘Electronic communication’
means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photo optical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.”).
194. See generally Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Federal Enactments Proscribing Obscenity and Child Pornography or Access Thereto on the
Internet, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1953 (2005) (describing the ways electronic
communication devices are used to engage in criminal activity).
195. See Daniel S. Armagh, Virtual Child Pornography: Criminal Conduct or Protected
Speech?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 1994 (2002) (discussing the challenges law
enforcement officials and prosecutors face when dealing with electronically-based
criminal activity).
196. Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 12 (“[G]rooming . . . occur[s] when
an adult has ‘sexually-explicit conversations with the child and/or exposes the child
to pornographic material, to attempt to lower the child’s inhibitions to future sexual
contact.’”).
197. See id.
198. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W. 2d 914, 925 (Minn. 2017) (“[M]uch of the
conduct prohibited by the statute, including grooming, is integral to criminal
conduct.”).
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manifestation of the legislature’s intent to criminalize specific
grooming behaviors.199
It is in the interest of society to stop adult sexual predators
before such harm escalates from online communications to criminal
in-person behavior.200 Statutes that criminalize speech relating to
sexual activities or sexual abuse and exploitation of children should
be judged by a different standard than statutes that criminalize
sexual speech solely between adults.201 Due to the manner in which
the prohibited speech under section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) may
be used to coerce, solicit, or entice a child, it is distinguishable from
Ashcroft.202 Section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is a necessary
safeguard to protect children from criminal behavior.203
1. Grooming is Outside the Protection of the First Amendment
Much of the speech prohibited by section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2) is integral to criminal conduct and outside First Amendment
protections.204 This speech prohibited by the statute cannot
generally implicate the protections of the First Amendment since it
is directly related to the grooming process, an integral portion of
criminal sexual abuse of children.205 The Minnesota Legislature’s
intention to criminalize specific grooming behaviors that harm
children, thereby stopping adult sexual predators before the
communications lead to harmful or abusive behavior in person, is
constitutional in its current form given the specific intent
requirement of the statute.206 The grooming process itself contains
199. Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 2–12.
200. See id. at 13–14.
201. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632–35 (1968) (affirming a
New York state ban on the sale of magazines depicting nudity to individuals under
the age of seventeen even though the magazines regulated by the statute were not
obscene for adults); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251–52 (2002)
(citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629) (“The Government, of course, may
punish adults who provide unsuitable materials to children . . . .”).
202. See Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 924–25.
203. See Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 15–16.
204. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 924.
205. See Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 12.
206. See id. at 16–17 (“[T]he statute as enacted is narrowly tailored to address
the constitutional tipping point when an adult can be held accountable by the
criminal justice system for engaging in sexually explicit communications directed
toward a child. The statute’s intent component recognizes that grooming is part of
the equation.”).
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a great deal of “intentionality” on behalf of the perpetrator to
commit a criminal act.207 Therefore, similar to other forms of speech
related to criminal conduct,208 there is a direct link between the
speech regulated by the statute (speech related to grooming) and
future criminal activity.209
In contrast, the speech in Ashcroft did not possess this crucial
element, as it was not the proximate cause of a criminal act.210 The
speech’s direct link to grooming prevents the First Amendment from
protecting the speech regulated by section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2). Given the certain danger presented by the grooming process,
the Minnesota State Legislature effectively promulgated section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2) within these bounds.211
D.

Section 609.352, subdiv. 2a(2) is Narrowly Tailored to Achieve a
Compelling Governmental Interest

Towards the end of the Muccio opinion, the Minnesota Supreme
Court identified two additional lines of analysis pertinent to the
subject matter of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2).212 Since the
court determined that the statute is not substantially overbroad,
there was no need to further analyze whether the statute was
207. See id. at 13 (“Grooming encompasses additional facets of intentionality—
often child sexual abuse is considered as a ‘process’ more than an ‘act’ because
grooming requires a sustained level of engagement by the adult to shape the child’s
perspective [and] reduce potential resistance . . . .”).
208. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969). In Brandenburg, the
Court set a standard under which a form of speech related to criminal conduct can
be prohibited by statute. Id. at 448–49. Speech may be prohibited by statute if it is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” Id. at 447. “[W]e are
here confronted with a statute which . . . purports to punish mere advocacy and to
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate
the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 449.
209. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 924 (“In this context, the communication is both
linked to and designed to facilitate the commission of the later crime.”).
210. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
211. See id. at 249 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (“Where
the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse, Ferber recognized that
the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to any judgment about
its content.”).
212. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d at 929 n.6. (explaining that if the statute had been
substantially overbroad, the next two lines of analysis would have been (1) whether
the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest or (2)
whether a limiting interpretation would preserve the statute’s constitutionality).
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narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.213
However, the issue of whether section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2)
passes this test still offers intriguing discussion. Even if the statute in
Muccio was held unconstitutional on either the “speech integral to
criminal conduct” or “obscenity” grounds, the state could have still
permissibly proscribed the speech of section 609.352, subdivision
2a(2) if it was shown that the statute “(1) is justified by a compelling
government interest and (2) is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.”214 In order to offer a complete analysis of the Muccio
decision and its implicated doctrines, the following sections will
pursue this line of analysis.
A regime of tests and standards dominate much of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence since the mid-twentieth century.215
Stephen Siegel’s analytical view of constitutional jurisprudence
strikes this author as especially perceptive, so it has been adopted for
this portion of the article. According to Siegel’s analytical view, the
Supreme Court employs a three-level scrutiny standard.216 This
standard’s three levels of analysis assign separate levels of
“heightened protection” to various constitutional norms or rights.217
A statute which attempts to regulate while disregarding a protected
constitutional norm or right may be found unconstitutional under
this standard.218
The three levels of the scrutiny standard are “strict scrutiny,”
“intermediate scrutiny,” and “minimal scrutiny with bite.”219 The
213. Id.
214. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 21 (Minn. 2014) (citing Brown v.
Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)).
215. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 358 (2006) (“[T]he whole regime of varying the
tiers of scrutiny is itself but one of the techniques by which the modern Court gives
differential protection to constitutional norms.”).
216. Id.
217. Id. (defining heightened protection as “any rule, standard, or analytic
approach that gives a constitutional right more security than the minimal
protections of rationality review”). For instance, if a statute purports to regulate a
constitutional right established by the Court to be subject to the “intermediate” level
of scrutiny, upon a challenge to the statute, the government must establish “that
[the statute’s] actual purpose substantially promotes an important government
interest.” Id. at 358 n.25.
218. See id. at 355 (“[Strict scrutiny] come[s] into play, for example, whenever
government employs a suspect classification, burdens a fundamental interest, or
adopts a content-based regulation of speech.”).
219. Id. at 358, 359 n.35 (“Minimal scrutiny upholds all action that is a rational
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compelling governmental interest test mentioned by the Muccio
court is largely derived from the strict scrutiny level of analysis.220
The strict scrutiny test “requires the government to pursue a
‘compelling state interest;’ and demands that [all statutory]
regulation promoting the compelling interest be ‘narrowly
tailored.’”221 Both of these factors must be present if a statute is to
survive the strict scrutiny test.222 It is also worth noting that, in the
context of statutes which seek to prohibit forms of speech, subjection
to the strict scrutiny test is only appropriate when the statute’s
prohibition on a form of speech is content-based.223
The “compelling governmental interest” test mentioned by the
Muccio court was first used by the United States Supreme Court in
First Amendment litigation towards the end of the 1950s, and into
the 1960s.224 A significant, yet unrefined, application of the test in
the context of an individual’s First Amendment rights was found in
Barenblatt v. United States.225 In Barenblatt, a college professor refused
to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party and
Communist-front clubs when he was called before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee.226 In his majority opinion, Justice
Harlan explained the need for a strict balancing test when both

means to accomplish to a legitimate government purpose.”)
220. Id. at 359 (“If strict scrutiny is but one of the approaches that give enhanced
protection to constitutional rights, the compelling state interest standard is just one
part of strict scrutiny analysis.”); see also, State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn.
2017) (discussing the potential need to evaluate the statute based on strict scrutiny
if it failed for substantial overbreadth).
221. Siegel, supra note 215, at 359–60. “The compelling state interest test, and
the doctrine of strict scrutiny. . . are only two of a host of techniques by which the
Supreme Court, since the New Deal, has bifurcated judicial review into heightened
protection for favored rights and minimal protection for the rest.” Id. at 358.
222. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“It is not
enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the means must be
carefully tailored to achieve those ends.”).
223. Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 215, at 335 (“[Strict scrutiny] come[s] into
play, for example, whenever government employs a suspect classification, burdens
a fundamental interest, or adopts a content-based regulation of speech.”).
224. Siegel, supra note 215, at 361. It was in these years, with United States
Supreme Court justices acutely aware of national security concerns during the Cold
War, that the doctrine developed as a way to afford First Amendment protections
but still allow the United States government to prohibit speech which could be
severely detrimental to the safety of the public at large. See id.
225. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
226. Id. at 114.
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public and private First Amendment interests are involved.227 Justice
Harlan also stated that in cases involving the First Amendment, the
“subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.”228 With this
holding, the United States Supreme Court laid the groundwork for
the “compelling government interest test” currently in use.229 In later
years, the test found application in other areas of First Amendment
issues, including the regulation of sexualized speech.230
1. Section 609.352, subdiv. 2(a)(2), is a Proper Candidate for the
Strict Scrutiny Test, is Narrowly Tailored, and Achieves a
Compelling Governmental Interest
Section 609.352, subdivision 2(a)(2), can be subject to the strict
scrutiny test since it regulates speech purely based on
subject-matter.231 In other words, content-based regulations are
subject to the strict scrutiny test because they directly regulate the
substance of a form of speech.232 When courts decide whether a
statute is ripe for review under the strict scrutiny test, other
constitutional doctrines, such as overbreadth, can affect their overall
determination of constitutionality.233 In cases such as Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court applied the strict
scrutiny test to situations involving sexualized speech and minors.234
It is evident, therefore, that section 609.352, subdivision 2(a)(2) is
ripe for review under the strict scrutiny test since it involves a statute
which proscribes sexualized speech to minors based purely on the
content of the speech.
The requirement that a statute be “narrowly tailored” offers less
room for debate compared to a determination of whether the
interest a statute protects is “compelling.”235 In short, this
227. Id. at 126–27.
228. Id. at 127 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957)).
229. See Siegel, supra note 215, at 361.
230. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Am. Civ. Liberties
Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003); Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2003).
231. See Chad Davidson, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Government Must
Demonstrate There is Not a Less Restrictive Alternative Before a Content-Based Restriction of
Protected Speech Can Survive Strict Scrutiny, 70 MISS. L.J. 457, 458 (2000).
232. Id. (citation omitted).
233. Id. at 464.
234. 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 (1997).
235. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1321–29 (2007) (“The Supreme Court has frequently adopted an astonishingly

2018]

LIMITING FREE SPEECH TO PROTECT CHILDREN

355

requirement of the strict scrutiny test can be parsed out into three
further categories.236 In essence, a statute’s prohibition is seen as
narrowly tailored if: (1) the means chosen for the prohibition are
the “least restrictive alternative” for the government to achieve its
goals;237 (2) the governmental infringement is not under-inclusive
(that is, the government cannot infringe on the citizenry’s rights
when doing so will foreseeably fail to achieve the restriction’s
goals);238 and (3) the governmental infringement is not overinclusive.239
In the context of the Muccio decision, it is evident that section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is narrowly tailored. The statute is
effectively the least restrictive way the government may intrude on
an individual’s right to free speech because the statute’s specific
intent requirement necessitates the adult actor to act with the intent
to arouse the sexual desire of a child. Drawing from the court’s
overbreadth analysis of the statute, it can be observed how section
609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is distinguishable from other statutes that
attempt to criminalize the transmission of indecent sexualized
materials from adults to children.240 As the Minnesota Supreme
Court observes in the Muccio opinion, much of the speech
prohibited by section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is either integral to
criminal conduct or obscene in nature, two forms of speech outside
the First Amendment’s protections.241 For these reasons, the
government’s infringement upon persons’ rights to free speech in
this statute is narrowly tailored.

casual approach to identifying compelling interests.”).
236. Id.
237. Fallon, supra note 235, at 1326; see, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (providing that protected speech must be
regulated by the “least restrictive alternative”); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538
(1989) (striking down a governmental action because a less speech-restrictive
alternative was available).
238. Fallon, supra note 235, at 1327.
239. Id. at 1328. Similar to the “least restrictive alternative” requirement, the
infringement of rights chosen by the government must be not be over-inclusive in
the sense that a statute could be invalidated for lack of narrow-tailoring if lessrestrictive alternative exists at all. Id.
240. State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 927–28 (Minn. 2017).
241. Id. at 923 (“The State argues that the statute regulates only speech integral
to criminal conduct and speech that is obscene, which are categories of speech that
the First Amendment does not protect.”).
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A proper application of the strict scrutiny test necessarily
involves the identification of the specific interests the government
holds to be “compelling.”242 Determining whether an interest is
compelling has often depended on the time period and make-up of
the Court.243 In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court
declared that compelling interests are those found in the
Constitution.244 However, other commentators including Justices of
the United States Supreme Court have argued that these compelling
interests may be ascertained with little to no textual inquiry.245 It is
not abundantly evident how a court chooses to determine which
interests are compelling, and which interests are not.246 Nonetheless,
in cases such as Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,247 U.S. v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc.,248 and New York v. Ferber,249 the Court has
found that a compelling governmental interest exists when the
transmission of sexualized speech to minors is involved. Allowing
adults to directly communicate with children, with the intent to
arouse sexual desire, can often be an integral part of the grooming
process through which sexual predators obtain victims for
subsequent criminal sexual abuse.250

242. Fallon, supra note 235, at 1321.
243. See id. at 1322–23 (citing Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 317–18 (1992)) (“Bruce Ackerman has argued that judicial
conservatives are more willing to find compelling interests implicit in the
Constitution than to conclude that the Constitution implicitly creates or recognizes
fundamental rights.”).
244. 438 U.S. 265, 311–13 (1978) (asserting that a public university has
a compelling interest in selecting a diverse student body, which arises from the
institution’s First Amendment right to academic freedom).
245. Fallon, supra note 235, at 1322.
246. See id. (describing various methods that have been used, or proposed, to
determine if an interest is compelling).
247. 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997).
248. 529 U.S. 803, 814, 826–27 (2000).
249. 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 747 (1996) (“[T]he
interest of protecting children [from sex-related material] . . . is compelling.”);
Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have recognized that
there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of
literature that is not obscene by adult standards.”). 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
250. See Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining that among other
activities, “[g]rooming also includes enticement and solicitation”).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Muccio, the court determined that section 609.352,
subdivision 2a(2) does not violate the First Amendment.251 Following
the holding in Williams, the court deemed the language prohibited
by the statute to be “integral to criminal conduct,” and, therefore,
outside the protections of the First Amendment.252 Additionally, in
accord with the holdings of Williams and Washington-Davis, the Court
held that the language of section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) is
narrowly focused on prohibiting speech integral to criminal
conduct.253
In many situations, sexualized speech can be directed at a child
with the intent to wrongfully seduce or abuse.254 This type of speech
is integral to the incredibly dangerous grooming process. Therefore,
the court correctly upheld Minnesota Statute section 609.352
subdivision 2a(2) as a constitutional safeguard in the interest of
criminalizing speech used to facilitate the commission of a
particularly heinous crime.

251.
252.
253.
254.

State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2017).
Id. at 923 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008)).
Id.
Brief for MNCASA, supra note 15, at 13 (citation omitted).
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